



**Belgian Standing Intelligence  
Agencies Review Committee**

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**N° Notice : 2018.262**

**Review investigation of the information available to the  
intelligence services regarding the death of Dag Hammarskjöld –  
Final Report.**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### I.1. MANDATE

In compliance with resolution A/RES/72/252 of 24 December 2017 of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN), the federal government of Belgium – by means of the Ministers of Justice and of Defence –, in April 2018, requested Mr. Guy Rapaille, Chairman of the Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee (Standing Committee I), to act as independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated internal review of the intelligence, security and defence archives to search for relevant information regarding the conditions and circumstances resulting in the death of former Secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld and the party accompanying him on the night of 17 to 18 September 1961. In his capacity as Chairman of the Standing Committee I, Mr. Rapaille has access to the (classified) files and archives of both the military and civil intelligence agencies of Belgium, namely the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS) and the State Security.

Mr. Rapaille communicated by letter on 25 April 2018 to the Ministers of Justice and of Defence that he was willing to accept – in the name of the Standing Committee I – the request submitted to him by the federal government. He accepted the assignment *‘to respond to requests from the United Nations as an independent, high-level officer responsible for conducting a focused review of the archives of the Belgian intelligence, security and defence services, to determine whether they contain information relevant to the investigation into the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, and to transmit to the Secretary-General a summary of the conclusions of that examination’*.

The Chairman of the Chamber of Representatives was also informed on 24 April 2018 of the acceptance of this assignment, as the Standing Committee I is a parliamentary body.

For the investigations in the (unclassified) files and archives of the Ministry of Defence, the federal government decided to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Kris Quanten, professor at the Royal Military Academy (RMA) to assist Mr. Rapaille in his mandate.

After the retirement of Mr. Rapaille on 1 October 2018, his successor as Chairman of the Belgian Standing Committee I, Mr. Serge Lipszyc, was appointed by the Belgian federal government to replace Mr. Rapaille as independent and high-ranking official to conduct the review of the intelligence and security and archives on 29 March 2019.

It should be emphasized that the mandate given by the Belgian federal government to Mr. Rapaille and subsequently Mr. Lipszyc and Lieutenant-Colonel Quanten respectively only provides access to the archives of the two intelligence services and of the Ministry of Defence, and not to the archives of other state bodies, non-state actors or private organisations.

## **I.2. Methodology and activities**

### **I.2.1. INVESTIGATION PROPOSAL AND DECISION**

According to the usual procedures of the Standing Committee I, a conceivable investigation proposal was formulated in the first instance. This proposal was then approved by the Standing Committee I, and converted into an investigation decision.

This investigation decision is as follows:

#### **a) Context**

The United Nations appointed a few years ago an Eminent Person, Judge Othman, to try to shed light on the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations, during the crash of his plane in the Katanga during the civil war in Congo in 1961.

Mr. Othman published a report on his work in late 2015. Following this report, the UN General Assembly adopted a new resolution renewing the mandate of Mr. Othman.

This resolution makes the following particular request: *‘The UN General Assembly encourages all member States that may hold relevant information related to the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and the members of the party accompanying him to appoint, without delay, an independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated internal review of their intelligence, security and defence archives to determine whether relevant information exists, and to communicate a summary of the results to the Secretary-General before the end of the main part of its seventy-third session under such confidentiality arrangements as presented in the report of the Eminent Person.’*

The causes of the UN Secretary-General’s plane crash on the night of 17 to 18 September 1961 have never been established and have given rise to numerous enquiries and hypotheses. A book published in 2011 – ‘Who Killed Hammarskjöld’ by Susan Williams – rekindled interest in this tragic event and led the United Nations to entrust an Eminent Person with the task of conducting an investigation.

Belgium is primarily concerned since a civil war was raging in its former colony and particularly in the Katanga province that had seceded. Moreover, for a long time and also in the first report of judge Othman, Belgium and Belgians are quoted as having been able to participate or having played a role in the crash of the UN Secretary –General’s plane.

**b) Authority of the Standing Committee I**

It concerns an investigation requested by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Defence pursuant to Article 32 of the Law of 18 July 1991 on the Control of Police and Intelligence Services and the Coordination Body for Threat Analysis.

**c) Purpose of the investigation**

The purpose of the investigation is to examine the archives of the State Security and GISS – which did not exist at the material time, but there was a military intelligence service whose archives are kept at the GISS – to discover if they contain ‘relevant information’ concerning the crash of the aircraft, and to transmit a summary of the conclusions of this examination to the Eminent Person.

**d) Investigation questions**

- Do both services have information in their archives related to the death of Dag Hammarskjöld?
- Do the services have information on persons named in the UN-report, whether Belgians or non-Belgians, airmen or not, military or former military personnel, mercenaries or other persons who have played a role in the secession of Katanga and the fighting that has taken place, as well as on planes used in fighting in Katanga?
- Non-exhaustive, are cited a certain ‘Beukels’, a certain ‘Van Risseghem’ (several spelling possibilities of this name are cited in the report), Lieutenant-Colonel Lamouline, a certain ‘De Troyer’, a certain ‘Jerry Puren’ etc...
- Do the two services have any information after 1961 on the facts or persons cited, since on several occasions in the 1960s and after articles, interviews, books, ... were published? There have also been more or less formal inquiries in concerned countries such as Sweden. Are the services informed of these surveys?

#### **e) Methods of collecting information**

Since it concerns events which took place 57 years ago, the only method of investigation is to consult the archives of both services. The consultation may lead the Standing Committee I to question other government departments such as Defence or Foreign Affairs.

#### **I.2.2. DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES**

As stated above, the search for relevant information in the context of the investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the death of former Secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld, was limited to the files and archives of the two intelligence services and of the Ministry of Defence.

The State Security and the GISS were contacted on 8 May 2018 with the request to appoint persons who could act as a point of contact (POC) in the context of this research. Shortly afterwards, the services announced that they wished to appoint the heads of their respective archives departments as point of contact.

The search was based on the reading of the report A/71/1042 of July 2017, written by the Eminent Person, Judge Mohamed Chande Othman.

The reading of the report focused on the identification of any information that could point to Belgium, or to persons and/or entities that could be associated with Belgium. In this way, a number of elements could be identified.

#### **a) Elements referring to Belgium in the UN-report of Mr. Othman**

- 1) The UN Independent Panel of Experts obtained information in 2015 that a Belgian pilot, who as a mercenary trained pilots of the Katangese air force, had possibly shot down Dag Hammarskjöld's plane. This information came from a message from the American ambassador to Congo in 1961, Edmund Gullion, to Washington. The name quoted in this message is a certain Van Riesegehel (real name or alias). Other possible spellings of the name are Van Risseghem, Van Reisseghem, Van Rysseghem, Van Reisenghan. Certain rumors circulated that this individual was possibly a Rhodesian mercenary.

Information from the Belgian authorities indicates that a certain Van Risseghem stayed in Belgium until 16 September 1961, after travelling to Belgium from Katanga on 8 September. On 22 September, the American embassy in Brussels sent a message to Washington that showed that there had been contact between the two countries about Van Risseghem. This contact showed that according to the Belgian authorities, Van Risseghem was at that time possibly in Brussels or Paris.

A report from the UNOC (=mission of the UN in Congo) from 1962 on the activities of mercenaries in Katanga mentions that Van Risseghem was arrested in Elisabethville on 28 August 1961 and was repatriated to Belgium on 7 September. However, he would have been involved in hostilities against UN troops as pilot of a Fouga Magister aircraft later in the month of September. The person concerned was then known under the alias 'Captain Jan'.

Another message from the US ambassador in Congo of 16 September 1961 reports that a pilot of a commercial aircraft had recognized the pilot in an incident involving a Katangese jet plane as 'Van Reisseghem'. Van Risseghem / Van Reisseghem would be a former pilot of Sabena.

Finally, information from the Belgian government, communicated to the UN in 2017, claims that the only pilot of a Fouga Magister plane who was employed by Katanga, was a certain Peter Wicksteed.

- 2) A Belgian mercenary pilot named 'Beukels' (other possible spellings: Beuckels, Beuchels) in 1967 would have told Mr. Claude de Kemoularia, former assistant of Dag Hammarskjöld, that he would have inadvertently shot down Mr. Hammarskjöld's plane. His intention would have been to force the plane to land in Kamina, on the orders of the Chief of Staff of the Katangese armed forces. This chief of staff would also have been a Belgian, a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Lamouline.

Also another (Belgian?) mercenary would have been aware of the above facts, a certain De Troyer or De Troye (possible alias: Claude Bastard).

- 3) American information is available that around 16 February 1961 three fighter planes, type Fouga Magister from the firm 'Potez', were shipped from France to Katanga by an American company 'Seven Seas Airlines'. These fighter aircraft would have been ordered by 'Belgium'.

The Katangese air force according to American, Belgian and German information would, in September 1961, also have disposed of several aircraft type Dornier-27 or 28. These aircraft would have been flown from Munich to Katanga in August 1961. The aircraft would have been delivered in the name of a certain Belgian colonel John Cassart.

- 4) It appears from documents of the UN that at least eleven mercenary pilots were employed by the Katangese air force during the period 1961-1962. A number of names of these pilots are mentioned in the report: Delin, Gelen, Glaspole, Hirsch, Magain, (Jerry) Puren (or Purren), Van Risseghem, Verloo, and Wicksteed (or Wickstead).

- 5) A certain Charles Southall, employee of the American NSA and stationed in Nicosia (Cyprus) on 17-18 September 1961, stated that he had seen a transcript of a communication that night, in which a pilot of an aircraft reports that he had shot down Mr. Hammarskjöld's plane.  
An unidentified American officer then informed Southall that the pilot in question was a Belgian, known as 'lone ranger'. This would have been the call sign of the Belgian pilot Joseph Delin (source: an article in the journal 'Modern African Studies' by Bengt Rösiö).

#### **b) Query for the services**

On 23 May 2018, a delegation of the Standing Committee I visited the two intelligence services, with the aim of making agreements with the designated POC about the investigations to be carried out in the archives of the services.

On this occasion, the Standing Committee I handed over a letter with a number of questions. These questions were based on the elements described under 2. a)

The questions were the following:

- 1) What information is available at your service about VAN RISSEGHEM (or other possible spelling)? What information is available about WIGSTEAD (other possible spellings: WICKSTEAD or WICKSTEED)? What information is available in the archives regarding the then involvement of (Belgian) mercenaries with the Katangese armed forces?
- 2) What information does your service have regarding BEUKELS (BEUCKELS, BEUCHELS), Robert LAMOULINE, DE TROYER or Claude BASTARD?
- 3) What information is available at your service about deliveries of aircraft to Katanga in 1960-61, and the persons or entities involved, for example John CASSART?
- 4) What information is available at your service about the following names: (Joseph) DELIN, GELEN, GLASSPOLE, HIRSCH, (José) MAGAIN, (Jerry) PUREN (or PURREN), VERLOO, Charles HUYGHE?



## II. INDEX OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

INDEX OF RELEVANT INFORMATION IDENTIFIED				
Type of information	Origin	Location	Summary of content	Classification
<u>File 'Van Risseghem'</u>				
1. Identity sheet of 'Jean Henri Van Risseghem de Sautiernon de S <sup>t</sup> -Clément', dd.08/11/1962	State Security (VSSE)	State Security archives		Declassified
2. Note of the Administrator-director-general of the State Security requesting an investigation into Van Risseghem, on behalf of the Ministry of African Affairs, dd.19/09/1961	State Security (VSSE)	State Security archives		Declassified

<p>3. Intel report on the identification and background of Jean Henri Van Risseghem de Sautiernon de S<sup>t</sup>.-Clément, dd. 20/09/1962</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Contains information on the employment of Van Risseghem by the Belgian air force and Sabena, prior to 1961, and also confirms his employment by the army of Katanga in 1961. The report further states that he was probably recruited in Katanga.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p>4. Intel report on the background and whereabouts of Jean Henri Van Risseghem, dd. 21/09/1961</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Confirms the involvement of Jean Henri Van Risseghem with the air force of Katanga (Avikat) as pilot/instructor in 1961, and his return to Belgium from Katanga in late August or beginning of September 1961. The report states that he left his home in Lint (Belgium) for Katanga on 16 September 1961.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p>5. Intel report nr.1598 on the return to Belgium of Jean Van Risseghem, dd.21/09/1961</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Confirms that the passenger Jean Van Risseghem, arriving with the flight Kamina (Congo)-Brussels, was checked at Brussels airport on 8 September 1961.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p>6. Intel report on the visit of mercenaries to the diplomatic mission of Katanga in Brussels, dd.29/09/1961</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Mentions the visit of (Belgian) mercenaries to the diplomatic mission of Katanga in Brussels. The name Van Risseghem is mentioned in the margin of the report, but not in the report itself. The report also contains information on the delivery of a type Dornier airplane to Katanga, and the involvement of Jean Cassart in this transaction. It also identifies the pilot of the only operational Fouga Magister airplane of the air force of Katanga in September 1961 as one Peter Wicksteed.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>

<p>7. Intel report on the activities of Jan Van Risseghem, dd.08/05/1962</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Confirms the membership of Van Risseghem of the gendarmerie of Katanga as 'volunteer'. The report states that van Risseghem had the rank of Commander and acted as pilot of a Fouga Magister airplane during the hostilities with UN troops in 1961. Van Risseghem would have also acted as commander of the airbase of either Luena or Luano (Elisabethville). After being arrested in Katanga in August 1961 (by the UN?) and being repatriated to Belgium, he returned to Africa and would have acted as an agent for the purchase of aircraft by the Katangese government in Salisbury (Rhodesia).</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p>8. Short note (date unknown) on the whereabouts of Jean Henri Van Risseghem between 17 and 21 September 1961</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Short note stating that Van Risseghem would have presented himself at the diplomatic mission of Katanga in Brussels to regulate his administrative situation, and that he arrived in Elisabethville on 21 September 1961, arriving from Paris.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p>9. Short biographical note on Jan Henri Van Risseghem, dd. 08/07/1967</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>States that Van Risseghem piloted one of the Fouga Magister airplanes in Katanga, and that he resided in Luanda (Angola) in April 1963.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p><u>File 'De Troyer'</u></p>				
<p>10. Identity sheet of 'Jacques De Troyer', date unknown</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>		<p>Declassified</p>

<p>11. Note from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Belgian Mission at UN, dd.05/10/1962, identifying Jacques De Troyer</p>	<p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Identifies Jacques De Troyer as a Belgian military officer. He would have acted as a military adviser and chief of personnel to the gendarmerie of Katanga in September 1961.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p><u>File 'Lamouline'</u></p>				
<p>12. Identity sheet of 'Robert Lamouline'</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>		<p>Declassified</p>
<p>13. Letter of State Security to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the result of investigations into the background of several Belgian mercenaries, active in Katanga, dd.12/10/1962</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>States that Lamouline acts as leader of a group of 12 foreign officers and of a private army, operating under orders of the local chieftain Kasongo-Niembo in Kamina (Congo)</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p>14. Intel report on the past activities of Robert Lamouline, dd.28/11/1962</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>States that Lamouline served as officer in the Belgian army and subsequently the colonial Force Publique from 1944 until 1961.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>

<p><u>File 'Huyghe'</u></p> <p>15. Identity sheet of 'Charles Corneille Juliette Huyghe', date unknown</p> <p>16. Intel report on the whereabouts of Charles 'Carlo' Huyghe, dd.06/09/1961</p> <p>17. Short note on Charles Huyghe, dd. 06/11/1976</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p> <p>State Security (VSSE)</p> <p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p> <p>State Security archives</p> <p>State Security archives</p>	<p>States that Huyghe was appointed as Major in the gendarmerie of Katanga and that he let the mission of Katanga in Brussels know in beginning September 1961 that he was staying in Brussels at that time.</p> <p>States that Charles Huyghe was a close collaborator of mr. Munongo, minister of the Interior during the secessionist period of Katanga, was based in Kamina and was involved in the procurement of weaponry for the government of Katanga.</p>	<p>Declassified</p> <p>Declassified</p> <p>Declassified</p>
<p><u>File 'Dornier'</u></p> <p>18. Letter from State Security to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dd.02/10/1961</p> <p>19. Intel note regarding transport of airplanes type Dornier from</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p> <p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p> <p>State Security archives</p>	<p>States that Jan Van Risseghem presented himself at the diplomatic mission of Katanga in Brussels on 17 September 1961. Further states that a fighter airplane of the type Dornier – disassembled and in cases - was shipped to Brazzaville by intervention of the Belgian citizen Jean Cassart, prior to hostilities between Katanga and the UN.</p> <p>Cites the names of 10 individuals belonging to possible crews which flew 4 airplanes, type Dornier, from Germany to Katanga.</p>	<p>Declassified</p> <p>Declassified</p>

<p>Germany to Katanga, dd.27/10/1961</p>				
<p>20. Note from State Security about the delivery of 5 airplanes, type Dornier, to Katanga</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>States that 5 airplanes, type Dornier, were ordered in Germany by the Belgian-Congolese company MITRACO, directed by Jean Cassart. One of the five planes would have been delivered in April 1961, and four at an unknown later date.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p>21. Short note with technical data sheet attached regarding Dornier-27 airplane, dd.24/10/1961.</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>States that a Dornier-27 type airplane is in principle used as a transport plane, but can also be converted in a fighter or bomber plane.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p>22. Letter from State Security to Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the background of Jean Cassart</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>		<p>Declassified</p>
<p>23. Intel report on the business results of MITRACO, dd.10/11/1961</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>MITRACO is the company responsible for the delivery to Katanga of Dornier type airplanes in 1961.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>

<p>24. Intel report on several crew members involved in flying Dornier airplanes to Katanga, dd.10/11/1961</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Identification of 4 individuals, who were crew members for the flight of 4 Dornier type airplanes from Germany to Katanga.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p><u>File 'Documentation: Congo &amp; Rwanda-Burundi'</u></p> <p>25. Monthly report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on events Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, dd. 09/1961</p>	<p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Describes events in Congo from 25 August until 22 September 1961.</p>	<p>Declassified</p>
<p><u>File 'Documenten over Dag Hammarskjöld'</u></p> <p>26. Folder with documents on various subjects; Contents:</p> <p>a) 000002-000007: press articles on the delivery to Katanga and Congo of Fouga Magister type</p>	<p>'Jeune Europe' magazine</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>		<p>Confidential</p> <p>Unclassified</p>

airplanes, dd.05-06/1964				
b) 000008-000009: note from State Security to Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 6 Fouga Magister airplanes, blocked in the port of Antwerp, dd.18/03/1964	State Security (VSSE)	State Security archives		Confidential
c) 000010-000012: press article on the air capabilities of Avikat, dd.29/09/1961	'Pourquoi Pas?' magazine	State Security archives	Contains information on Katangese aviation (Avikat).	Unclassified
d) 000013: press article on the identity of the pilot of the Fouga Magister type airplane of Avikat, 03/10/1961	'La Libre Belgique' newspaper	State security archives	Claims that the Avikat Fouga Magister pilot is one José Deulin, of Belgian origin and former officer in the South African army.	Unclassified
e) 000014-000023: various press articles on the purchase by, and delivery to, Katanga of Fouga	'Le Soir', 'La Libre Belgique' and 'Le Peuple' newspapers	State Security archives	Confirms the purchase by the government of Katanga of three French Fouga Magister airplanes, and their delivery by the American company Seven Seas Airlines to Elisabethville.	Unclassified



Magister airplanes,02-03/1961				
f) 000024: intel report on the build-up of a mercenary force in Angola, dd.31/03/1964	State Security (VSSE)	State Security archives	States that the Belgian pilot who flew the Avikat Magister airplane during the hostilities between Katanga and the UN, was residing in Teixeira de Sousa (Angola) in the beginning of 1964.	Unclassified
g) 000025-000027: open source article on the death of mr. Hammarskjöld, dd.22/06/1963	'Remarques congolaises' magazine	State Security archives	Formulates different hypotheses regarding the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld. One hypothesis claims that an attempt to hijack Mr. Hammarskjöld's plane was the cause of the crash. The individual responsible for the failed hijacking would be one Robert Gheysels, a young Belgian officer with the rank of lieutenant in the gendarmerie of Katanga.	Unclassified
h) 000028-000031: letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the activities of (Belgian) mercenaries in Central Africa, dd.14/05/1963	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	State Security archives	Mentions activities and presence of Jan Van Risseghem in Luanda (Angola), and of Victor Verloo, also a former pilot of Avikat and mentioned in the UN-report of Mr. Othman, in Ndola (Rhodesia).	Unclassified
i) 000032-000033: press article regarding a UN-list of 50 foreign mercenaries active in Katanga, dd.15/11/1962	'La Dernière Heure' newspaper	State Security archives	Mentions several names of individuals serving as pilots of Avikat.	Unclassified

<p>j) 000034-000053: intel report containing a list of names of individuals serving as mercenaries in Katanga, dd.13/01/1962</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Mentions the name of J.C. Delin or Deulin as the commander of a Fouga Magister airplane of Avikat.</p>	<p>Unclassified</p>
<p>k) 000054-000056: intel report on 3 Polish nationals, residing in Belgium, who were intercepted by the UN in Katanga, dd.18/10/1961</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>		<p>Unclassified</p>
<p>l) 000057-000086: intel report nr.1120 containing a list of names of individuals (mercenaries), declared <i>persona non grata</i> by the Congolese government, dd.10/06/1963</p>	<p>State Security (VSSE)</p>	<p>State Security archives</p>	<p>Contains the names of several individuals who acted as pilot for Avikat</p>	<p>Confidential</p>
<p><u>File 'GISS'</u></p>				

27. Intel report from an unconfirmed source, dd. 31/03/1988	GISS	GISS archives	Contains information on several individuals who made statements about the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld. One of these individuals is Jacques Duchemin who stated that Mr. Hammarskjöld's plane crashed after a failed hijack.	Confidential
28. List of names of (Belgian) mercenaries, active in Congo in 1960	GISS	GISS archives		Unclassified
29. Intel report containing an extract from the national register, dd. 08/02/2002	GISS	GISS archives	Identifies Roger Bracco (former pilot for Avikat in 1961).	Confidential
30. Intel report on mercenary activities, dd. 26/01/1996	GISS	GISS archives	Connects Roger Bracco to mercenary activities and to French mercenary leader Robert 'Bob' Denard.	Confidential
31. Intel report on mercenary activities, dd. 08/01/1996	GISS	GISS archives	Contains information on the whereabouts and activities of Roger Bracco.	Confidential
32. Data sheet, dd. 28/07/1955	GISS	GISS archives	Confirms that Roger Bracco followed a pilot training in 1955.	Confidential

<u>File 'Centre de Documentation Historique de la Défense (CDH)'</u>				
33. Telegram from the Belgian Consulate in Salisbury to Brussels – 26 January 1962	CDH	Military archives	Contains the testimony of Roland Parmentier of UMHK concerning the night flight capacity of the airfield of Kengere	Unclassified
34. <i>Extrait de Matricule</i> of Jan Van Risseghem	CDH	Military archives	General information on the military career of Van Risseghem in the Belgian Army	Unclassified
35. Letter from Potez Air Fouga to <i>Secrétaire d'Etat de la Défense au Katanga</i> – February 1961	CDH	Military archives	Potez Air Fouga sends three technicians to Katanga to make the Fouga Magister operational	Unclassified
36. Fouga Magister CM170 Technical Analysis	Belgian Air Force Aviation Safety Directorate	Belgian Defence	Technical analysis of the capacities of the Fouga Magister <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ann A : Reference of flight manual 1961</li> <li>• Ann B : Cruise table</li> <li>• Ann C : Performance charts</li> <li>• Ann D : Night flight</li> <li>• Ann E : Night landing pattern</li> <li>• Ann F : Weapons</li> </ul>	Unclassified
37. Van Risseghem's pilot logbook	Family archives	Antwerp	Contains all the information concerning the flights Van Risseghem executed during the months July – August – September 1961	Unclassified

### III. FINDINGS

For the scope of the review, full access was given by the Belgian Government to all the files and archives kept by the Ministry of Defence (in the *Centre de Documentation Historique de la Défense* in Evere, Brussels), the State Security service (VSSE) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS, military intelligence service).

The conclusion after a thorough and meticulous analysis of these archives, is that they do not contain any direct information related to the death of Dag Hammarskjöld. Nevertheless, some elements which may shed an additional light on the proposed research, have been selected :

#### **Fouga Magister CM 170**

In order to gain a better understanding of the capacities of the Fouga Magister, a technical analysis was ordered (36). As the Belgian Air Force used exactly the same airplanes at that moment, the Belgian Air Force Aviation Safety Directorate (which in addition to their practical flight experience, also retains all the necessary archives related to the Belgian Fouga Magister) was called upon. In order to guide the research and analysis, the following questions were proposed to them :

- What was the maximum range of the Fouga Magister CM 170?
- Was the CM 170 equipped with onboard radar?
- Was the CM 170 capable of performing a night intercept?
- The CM 170 was equipped with which radio and what were the emission and reception ranges?
- Could the CM 170 operate from an unprepared runway (laterite, grass, etc) or did it need a prepared runway (asphalt, concrete)?
- Was the CM 170 equipped to take-off, land and operate during the night?
- Did the CM 170 have an air-to-air capability?

For the full report and the detailed answers to the different questions, please refer to the annex. In this report only the conclusions are presented.

The Fouga Magister CM 170 was a two-seater training aircraft, equipped with two jet engines. The Katangese leader, Moïse Tshombe, initially ordered nine Fougas from the company Potez Air Fouga (which was established in France) (35). However, only three of the ordered planes were delivered at the airfield of Luano in Elisabethville on 15 February 1961. The other six were blocked in Pointe Noire (Congo Brazzaville) as a direct consequence of the UN embargo imposed upon Katanga (the six remaining Fougas would finally end up in Ireland). The three Fouga Magister planes of the Avikat were matriculated: KAT91, KAT92 and KAT93. KAT91 crashed in June '61 during a training mission (pilot Jean-

Marie Dagonnier). KAT92 was in repair in August 1961 due to engine failure (as a result of the intake of waste in one of the jet engines). It was seized at the airfield of Luano (Elisabethville) by the UN-forces during the operation Rumpunch at the end of August. Subsequently, the only Fouga Magister which was still operational in September 1961, was the KAT93 which operated from the airfield of Kengere in Kolwezi.

The Fouga Magister were not equipped with an onboard radar, which makes an aircraft intercept at night most likely impossible. They were equipped with an ARTUS VHF-radio, which had a limited radius (line-of-sight). The armament consisted of two 7.62 mm machine guns placed in the nose of the plane. They disposed of no air-to-air capability. As the CM 170 is equipped with two jet engines and the air intakes are located rather close to the runway, the Fouga Magister cannot operate from an unprepared runway (laterite or grass). Only an emergency landing (with the engine inoperative or low engine setting) on an unprepared runway is possible (36). The only airfields with a hardened runway in 1961 in Katanga were Kamina (BaKa), Elisabethville (Luano) and Kolwezi (Kengere). The first two were under control of the UN in September 1961. This also explains why the main base of Avikat at that moment was Kolwezi.

Night flying in CM 170 was possible provided that the runway was equipped with a lighting system. But even in that case, accurate navigation at night continued to be a very difficult undertaking. Only gross visual navigation was possible provided very clear landmarks (light of cities, main roads or highways) were visible. Interesting in this respect is a telegram dated 26 January 1962 in which the Belgian Vice-Consul in Ndola, Jacques Matthys, mentions the testimony of Roland Parmentier, who was an agent of UMHK, to the official Rhodesian Commission of Inquiry (33). He declared that in September 1961 the beacons at the airfield of Kengere were not operational (since July 1961) because of maintenance works on the runway. According to his testimony, night flights were excluded from Kengere in September 1961.

### **Dornier airplanes (Dornier (DO) - 28)**

Katangese Aviation (Avikat) also disposed of German built airplanes of the type Dornier 28. From the information available, it is not entirely clear how many Dornier-28 planes were acquired by Avikat, and when these planes were delivered to Katanga.

One State Security document from the beginning of October 1961 states that one Dornier 28 could have already been flown from Germany to Brazzaville, and subsequently to Kolwezi, at a date prior to the hostilities between the gendarmerie of Katanga and the UN in September 1961. A second plane of the same type could have been flown from Germany directly to Katanga at an unknown date after the start of hostilities between Katanga and the UN (18).

Another document of the end of October 1961 contains information on a 'recent' delivery of four Dornier planes from Germany to Katanga, and cites the names of persons who would have operated these flights (19). The total number of Dornier planes delivered to Avikat could have been six (20).

A technical data sheet of 1961 describes the Dornier-27, of which the Dornier-28 was an improved and modernized version, as a propeller engine aircraft, normally used for transports and reconnaissance flights. However, it would have been possible to use the aircraft as a combat plane, if equipped with adjusted weaponry (21).

However, given its characteristics, it seems unlikely if not impossible, that a Dornier -28 aircraft, could have been used in an attack against a Douglas DC-6 plane, as was used to transport Mr. Hammarskjöld's delegation in September 1961.

### **Jan Van Risseghem**

Jan Van Risseghem de Sautiernon de Saint Clement (this was his official full name) was a Belgian pilot who was active in the Belgian Section of the Royal Air Force in Great Britain during the Second World War (34). After the war he left the Belgian Air Force and flew for civilian companies (this explains why in 1961 he still had the rank of senior captain in the reserve troops) (1 & 3). In March 1961 the Katangese Avikat recruited him as a mercenary pilot. Nearly six months later, on 28 August, he was arrested in Elisabethville by the UN-forces during the UN-operation 'Rumpunch' and was repatriated to Belgium on 7 September. He arrived at the airport of Zaventem in Belgium on 8 September where his arrival was formally registered (5). According to the archives of the Belgian State Security (*see above*), he stayed at least until 16 September in Belgium (4). From that date on, there were rumors that he would have returned to Katanga. As there are no traces concerning his departure from Zaventem international airport (the departure of known mercenaries was registered by the Belgian customs authorities), it is highly probable that he left via Paris (where there was no formal registration) (8). A journey from Belgium to Congo via Paris was quite an undertaking in 1961 and looked as follows:

- Antwerp (Van Risseghem lived in Lint, which is near Antwerp) to Brussels;
- By train from Brussels to Paris;
- By plane from Paris to Brazzaville;
- Crossing of the Congo River from Brazzaville to Leopoldville;
- By plane from Leopoldville to Elisabethville;
- By plane/train from Elisabethville to Kolwezi (airfield of Kengere).

Taking into account the length and complexity of the journey, it is clear that this would have taken several days. This implies a practical problem. Indeed, if Van Risseghem had left Antwerp (Belgium) no earlier than Saturday 16 September it seems hardly possible that he could already have arrived on Sunday evening 17 September in Kolwezi (Congo), ready to start a totally unprepared flight mission on the spot.

Besides that, the family archives contain Van Risseghem's original signed pilot logbook (37). In such a logbook, pilots note all the flights they operate, the precise timings, the type of airplane with which they flew, the purpose of the flight, the name of the copilot and the duration of the flight. According to Van Risseghem's logbook, his flights stopped on 27 August (which corresponds with the start of the operation 'Rumpunch' during which he was arrested) and resumed on 20 September 1961. During the months of July and August, he flew with the following types of aircraft : Dove, Piper, DC-3 and Fouga Magister. All the Fouga flights were with the airplane matriculated KAT93. The copilots mentioned were Delcourt, Wicksteed, Pieret, De L(o)uigi, and Bracco.

It is interesting to note that the logbook also mentions a night flight with the Fouga Magister on August 10, 1961. The copilot on this occasion was Bracco. This seems to suggest that it was possible to fly at night, and that the aircraft was indeed used for these purposes.

In September, Van Risseghem only flew with Dornier-28, which was being transferred at that moment from Brazzaville, coming from Germany. The copilot on these flights was 'Colonel John Cassart'.

Information that was obtained in the context of this research indicates that the latter can be most probably identified as Jean Cassart (°02/07/1906), a war volunteer during WWII and officer in the Belgian army until the mid-1950's. After his military career, Cassart became managing director of the Congolese company MITRACO, which acted as an intermediary in the purchase of Dornier airplanes by the government of Katanga in 1961 (22 & 23) .

## **Beukels**

Concerning the testimony of the French diplomat, Claude de Kemoularia, who met the Belgian mercenary pilot 'Beukels', the following elements were retained during our research :

- The military archives do not contain any reference to a pilot named Beukels. The same goes for all the publications we have read concerning the Avikat : his name is mentioned nowhere.



- According to the same testimony, Lieutenant-Colonel Lamouline was in charge of the air operations. However, Robert Lamouline had nothing to do with the Avikat. He was engaged in the *Gendarmerie Katangaise* (member of the ground forces) as the personal advisor to the tribal Chief Kasongo Nyembo and was in no way involved in the organization or execution of air operations (12, 13 & 14).
- According to the same testimony, two Fouga Magisters were involved in the operation. Nevertheless, in September 1961 there was only one operational Fouga Magister (KAT93) (see above).

### **Other mercenary pilots: Wicksteed, Bracco, Delin.**

Jan Van Risseghem's pilot logbook for the period July-August 1961 (*see above*) mentions four flights on Fouga Magister in July 1961, and four flights in August 1961. For each of these flights, the name of the copilot is mentioned. These names are Delcourt, Wicksteed, Pieret, De L(o)uigi, and Bracco.

A document from September 1961, provided by the State Security, identifies 'Wicksteed' as Peter Wicksteed, (°United Kingdom 06/04/1933), residing at 287c Nacton Road, Ipswich (6). 'Bracco' most probably identifies as Roger Bracco (°25/10/1934). From our research, we were able to obtain information that confirms that Roger Bracco was active as a mercenary (pilot) in Katanga at least in 1967. The name 'BRACCO R.J.' also appears on a list of names from June 1963 of mercenaries, declared *persona non grata* by the Congolese government (26 I). Other information indicates that until the mid-1990's, Bracco was still active in mercenary circles, and was a known associate of the infamous French mercenary leader 'Bob' Denard (30 & 31).

The name 'Delin / Deulin' is mentioned once in a State Security document of January 1962, containing a list of names of persons, believed to be active as mercenaries in Congo/Katanga (26 j). It is stated that Major José Delin or Deulin is of Belgian origin, but has lived in South Africa for a long time. In some open (Internet) sources, it is claimed that the name José Delin was in fact an alias of a pilot whose real name was José Magain or Mangain. No records were found regarding this latter name.

### **De Troyer**

The name De Troye or De Troyer is mentioned on pages 26-27 of Mr. Othman's report of 2017, in connection with the possible involvement of mercenary pilots in the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld, notably of a certain pilot named 'Beukels'. A number of interviews between this 'Beukels' and Mr. Claude de Kemoularia, a former personal assistant of Mr. Hammarskjöld, would have been arranged in Paris by 'De Troye'.

Our research has been able to show that a certain Jacques De Troyer (°19/03/1920) was a former officer in the Belgian army and was active as military adviser for the gendarmerie of Katanga in Elisabethville in 1961 (10 & 11). Subsequently, he would have returned to Belgium in November 1961. Information about his later activities is not available.

### **'Robert Gheysels'**

In March 1988, an (unidentified) individual provided the military intelligence service GISS with some elements of information surrounding the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld (27). One of these elements concerns claims which would have been made by a certain Jacques Duchemin, a French citizen, that the crash of Mr. Hammarskjöld plane would have been the result of a failed hijacking, undertaken by a young officer with the initials R.G, who was trained by a special 'action service' within the French secret services.

This version of events was published in the book *'Notre guerre au Katanga'*, of which Duchemin is a co-author, and is cited in the magazine *'Remarques congolaises'* of June 1963 (26 g), and on the internet page [www.inchi-yetu.be/hamer01.html](http://www.inchi-yetu.be/hamer01.html), where it is claimed that Duchemin was Undersecretary of War in the government of Katanga at the time of Mr. Hammarskjöld's crash.

According to these open sources, the young officer's name responsible for the failed hijacking of Mr. Hammarskjöld's plane and subsequent crash, would be one Robert Gheysels.

From further open source information, it can be learned that Jacques Duchemin is a former journalist and cabinet employee in the French government. On his personal website [jdcom.net](http://jdcom.net), he claims that he performed ministerial functions in several African governments, including that of Katanga. He also claims to have acted as a consultant to other governments and multinational corporations.

On the basis of this information, a search was conducted to find information on 'Robert Gheysels' in the concerned archives. However, this generated no results.

#### **IV. CONCLUSIONS**

The research carried out by the Standing Committee I and Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Kris Quanten of the Royal Military Academy (RMA) within the framework of this investigation, did not reveal any information that sheds new light on the precise circumstances that led to the death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld and his company in September 1961.

Our research has shown that the documentation available to the Belgian civil and military intelligence services, and to the Ministry of Defense regarding the events in Katanga in 1961, is rather limited.

As far as the State Security service is concerned, this can partly be explained by the fact that this service had and has only domestic competence, and therefore does not collect any information abroad. Moreover, the service stated that their intelligence work in the early 1960s, shortly after the independence of Congo, did not focus on the activities of mercenaries in the region.

The fact that searching the archives of the military intelligence service GISS and of the Ministry of Defense has yielded less useful documentation than at the State Security service, can be considered somewhat surprising. The GISS did and does have the authority and the means to gather information abroad. However, amazingly enough, at the beginning of the 1960s, the Belgian Defense did not seem to have much interest in the activities and whereabouts of mercenaries in Central Africa. This despite the fact that these mercenaries were often Belgian (ex-)soldiers.

Nevertheless, certain information found can contribute to a more precise identification of a number of quoted individuals, as well as to provide elements that make certain hypotheses more or less likely.

Over the years several names of Belgians, soldiers and others, who may have been involved in the September 1961 events in Katanga, were mentioned. Our research has allowed to formally identify some of these persons, and has also brought some information to light regarding their activities and whereabouts in the period that is of interest.

Firstly, information obtained from the State Security service, and from private family archives, has shown that the 'Van Risseghel/Van Risseghem', which was cited as the person who possibly piloted a Fouga Magister plane that possibly shot down Mr. Hammarskjöld's plane, could in fact be identified as Jan Van Risseghem de Sautiernon de Saint Clement, a former pilot of the British Royal Air Force during WWII and of the Belgian Air Force after the war. After his military career, he worked for several years in commercial aviation, specifically at the airline Sabena. Records confirm his involvement with Katangese Aviation (Avikat) as a mercenary pilot in 1961, but also show that he was most likely on his way from

Paris to Brazzaville on 17 and 18 September 1961. This information seems to indicate that he could not possibly have been involved in the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld.

Secondly, documents from archives of the Belgian civilian and military intelligence services also allowed the further identification of other (former) military personnel who were active in Katanga in 1961, such as Jacques De Troyer, Peter Wicksteed, Jean Cassart or Roger Bracco. However, the available information teaches us little about the then activities of the persons concerned, and even less about their possible involvement in the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld.

The research also revealed a number of names of other individuals who at that time seem to have been active as (co-)pilots on Fouga Magister flights for Avikat. In this way, we came across the names of Delcourt, Pieret, and De L(o)uigi. Unfortunately, no further information was available which could allow a more precise identification. One document from the archives of the State Security service suggests that De L(o)uigi could possibly have been a mercenary of Swiss nationality.

Furthermore, a number of other documents relate to Avikat's air capacity. Thus it can be established that the secessionist government of Katanga disposed of three aircraft of the Fouga Magister type, and five or six aircraft of the Dornier-28 type in 1961. At the time of the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld, however, only one aircraft from the three Fouga Magister seems to have been operational and in the hands of Avikat. As for the Dornier-28 planes, it is likely that most of these aircraft, possibly with the exception of one, was only delivered to Katanga after the hostilities between the UN and Katangese troops in September 1961.

The technical characteristics of the Fouga Magister and Dornier-28 type aircraft – such as absence of radar and suitable communication technology, absence of airfields with light installations, relatively low airspeed, absence of air-to-air weapons system – seem to indicate that it was unlikely that these types of aircraft could have been used for a nightly attack against a plane of the type Douglas DC-6, in which Mr. Hammarskjöld and his company flew to Ndola.

As requested in the timing set by the Eminent Person, Judge Othman, an interim report of the findings of this review was prepared at the end of September 2018.

It should be noted that, at that moment in time, all the State Security archives had already been searched, based on the questions asked by the Standing Committee I.

However, not all of the GISS sub-archives had been fully investigated in September 2018. In their own words, 65 percent of the archives were searched at that moment. The work continued after this time.

In accordance with the request made by Judge Othman in his letter of 26 January 2019, the Standing Committee I asked the additional question to the State Security service and the GISS if they were able to identify further records showing the presence of intelligence,

security and/or defence personnel or assets of Belgium or other countries in the Congo at the time.

Unfortunately, the additional searches of the archives after September 2018 did not yield any new pertinent results. This explains why the present final report is substantively identical to the interim report at the end of September 2018.

On May 20, 2019, the Standing Committee I also obtained a series of documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A number of these documents were already in the possession of the Standing Committee I and they were already delivered to the United Nations in April 2015, May 2015, June 2017 and April 2018 respectively. Therefore, these documents were not taken into account for the preparation of this report.

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